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Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the
mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent
with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g.,
ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans’ fallible minds and
God’s less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate
another agent’s less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among
children who understood ordinary humans’ mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of
correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development,
sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds.
During the preschool years, children’s understand-
ing of the capacities and limitations of others’
minds—their theory of mind (ToM)—undergoes
rapid change (Harris, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004).
Two-year-olds appreciate that people hold desires,
and that different people may desire different
things (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and 3-year-olds
additionally understand that people have thoughts
and beliefs—mental representations of stimuli (e.g.,
objects, people) even in the physical absence of
those stimuli (Wellman & Estes, 1986). Shortly
thereafter, children begin to appreciate certain limi-
tations of the mind. For example, older 3-year-olds
appreciate that people can be ignorant about some-
thing if they have not perceived it (Pratt & Bryant,
1990). Most 5-year-olds additionally understand
that people can hold false beliefs about the world
based on inaccurate or outdated information (Pern-
er, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), and soon thereafter
children begin to appreciate that individuals have
limited access to others’ private beliefs (Miller,
2009). But children (and adults) are not confronted
exclusively by ordinary human agents; people
entertain beliefs about agents who possess extraor-
dinary capacities that are distinctly nonhuman. For
example, television shows and movies abound with
characters who possess exceptional perceptual
capacities (e.g., X-ray vision), and many of the
world’s religions espouse beings who possess
extraordinary mental capacities (e.g., omniscience;
Campbell, 1972 ⁄1993; Pickover, 2001). How do peo-
ple come to understand the less constrained minds
of these agents? In this article, we investigate the
effects of sociocultural input and ToM on children’s
developing understanding of extraordinary minds.
In addition to providing a framework for how
other people think and behave, a ToM can facilitate
the representation of many sorts of minds, includ-
ing the minds of nonhuman and superhuman
beings (Boyer, 1996; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007; Evans & Wellman, 2006; Shtulman, 2008).
Concepts of extraordinary perceptual and cognitive
abilities begin to emerge during the preschool
years. But there is disagreement as to when and
how children differentiate between the minds of
ordinary humans and the minds of extraordinary
beings. Primarily, two theories have been proposed
to account for young children’s understanding of
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extraordinary minds. The first is an anthropomor-
phism hypothesis (Boyer, 1996; Piaget, 1929 ⁄1969),
which states that children initially attribute to all
agents the same psychological limits that they attri-
bute to ordinary humans, and only later come to
differentiate ordinary and extraordinary minds.
Thus, for example, when children begin to appreci-
ate that ordinary people can be ignorant or can
hold false beliefs, they attribute the same cognitive
limitation to all beings, ordinary and extraordinary.
Before that time, children fail to understand the dis-
tinction between (potentially fallible) belief states
and reality, so if required to judge beliefs they
merely report states of reality for human and non-
human agents. Several studies lend support to this
theory (e.g., Gime´nez-Dası´, Guerrero, & Harris,
2005). Using a knowledge-ignorance task, Makris
and Pnevmatikos (2007) found that 3- and 4-year-
olds reported that both a girl and God would be
ignorant about the contents of a closed box without
looking inside. Only children at age 5 and older dif-
ferentiated between the girl’s ignorance and God’s
correct knowledge of the box’s contents.
However, other studies provide evidence that
appears to counter the anthropomorphism hypothe-
sis. Barrett and colleagues (e.g., Barrett, Richert, &
Driesenga, 2001; Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran,
2004), for example, administered false-belief and
knowledge-access tasks to 3- to 7-year-olds, and
found that the youngest children attributed ‘‘infalli-
ble’’ mental capacities (i.e., correct knowledge and
correct beliefs) to all agents tested, including
humans and God, and older children who attrib-
uted ignorance and false beliefs to humans (typi-
cally those 5 years and older) continued to attribute
correct mental capacities to God. Barrett and col-
leagues conclude that these results support an alter-
native preparedness hypothesis (Barrett & Richert,
2003), whereby children’s early social-cognitive
biases (e.g., not attributing false beliefs to agents)
actually support the understanding of extraordi-
nary mental abilities. That is, before children
understand mental limitations (e.g., ignorance,
error, or false beliefs), they do not merely use real-
ity to attribute agents’ mental states (per the anthro-
pomorphism hypothesis); rather, they believe that
agents are all knowing. Accordingly, when children
begin to attribute a particular mental fallibility (e.g.,
false beliefs) to ordinary humans, they can simply
continue to attribute infallible mental capacities and
states to God.
These research findings apparently conflict and
are thus difficult to integrate theoretically. Criti-
cally, most extant studies lack data that are key to
testing the opposing hypotheses—namely, data on
the specific types of capacities children are actually
attributing to agents. Further, the prior studies typi-
cally group children in large age groups that may
mask nuanced developmental trajectories. To
address these issues, Lane, Wellman, and Evans
(2010) asked children from secular schools to make
judgments and reason about the knowledge and
beliefs of agents with contrasting perceptual
and mental abilities: ordinary humans; Heroman,
who ‘‘can see right through things’’; Mr. Smart,
who ‘‘knows everything’’; a cat with night vision;
and a religious deity (God). Critical to sufficiently
testing the preparedness and anthropomorphism
hypotheses, they densely sampled children at an
age when children were beginning to attribute
ignorance and false beliefs to ordinary humans.
Results indicated that the youngest children’s
(3-year-olds’) attribution of correct knowledge and
beliefs to all agents largely reflected a reality
bias—when justifying their decisions, 3-year-olds
referred to reality (specifically the box’s current
contents); they rarely mentioned the agents’ mental
capacities or constraints. Moreover, somewhat older
children (essentially 4-year-olds) who were begin-
ning to understand the mental limitations of ordin-
ary agents (ignorance and fallible beliefs), attributed
those same limitations to the minds of Mr. Smart
and God. Only the oldest children (5 years and
older) differentiated between the fallible mental
capacities (and resulting knowledge and beliefs) of
humans and the less constrained mental capacities
and states of God and Mr. Smart. Intriguingly, the
4-year-olds did appreciate that some agents’ excep-
tional perceptual abilities (e.g., Heroman’s X-ray
vision) could lead to accurate knowledge and beliefs,
but they did not appreciate extraordinary mental
abilities. Overall, these findings present clear evi-
dence in support of the anthropomorphism hypothe-
sis but also suggest that children come to appreciate
some exceptional perceptual capacities (e.g., X-ray
vision) before they appreciate extraordinary mental
capacities (e.g., infallible beliefs).
One reason children may have an early appre-
ciation of exceptional perceptual capacities is
because perceptual capacities are observably more
or less restricted across humans and animals—
some people see well without glasses, others need
them, dogs can hear silent dog whistles, and bats
have echolocation that allows them to navigate
in the dark. In addition, children’s early grasp
of exceptional perceptual abilities may reflect
exposure to ‘‘testimony,’’ and media in which
characters possess special abilities (e.g., bat’s
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echolocation, Superman’s X-ray vision). Indeed,
children may hear not only about exceptional per-
ceptual abilities but also about extraordinary men-
tal abilities through various forms of informal and
formal sociocultural input (Bergstrom, Moehl-
mann, & Boyer, 2006; Harris & Koenig,
2006)—including broadly, parent–child discourse,
oral and printed stories, movies, and formal or
informal exposure to religious doctrine. Importantly,
sociocultural input of these various forms can have
powerful effects on children’s conceptual develop-
ment (Shweder et al., 2006), even if that informa-
tion is not provided in an intentionally didactic
manner (Atran & Sperber, 1991). For example, a
large body of research demonstrates predictive
relations between everyday sociocultural input
(e.g., parent–child discourse about mental states)
and children’s developing understanding of ordinary
human minds (for a review, see Carpendale &
Lewis, 2004). Further, it is clear that sociocultural
input affects older children’s judgments of, for
example, God’s extraordinary ability to create the
living world (Evans, 2001). However, surprisingly
little is known about the effects of such input, and
focally exposure to religious ideas, on children’s
developing concepts of extraordinary minds. It
now seems unlikely that young children are cog-
nitively prepared to understand extraordinary men-
tal capacities, in that very young children evidence
a reality bias, rather than an understanding of
extraordinary mental capacities (Lane et al., 2010).
Nonetheless, when children do begin to consider
mental capacities of certain agents, exposure to
certain religious doctrines may facilitate the acqui-
sition and application of concepts of extraordinary
mental capacities. In particular, children who are
heavily exposed to ideas about agents with
extraordinary cognitive abilities (e.g., doctrine about
God’s omniscience) may more easily resist attrib-
uting cognitive limitations (e.g., false beliefs) to
such agents.
Many of the studies mentioned have included
children from religious communities but, again,
offer unclear or conflicting results. Makris and
Pnevmatikos (2007) offer evidence in favor of the
anthropomorphism hypothesis in a sample of Greek
Orthodox children. Further, in a sample of Spanish
children, Gime´nez-Dası´ et al. (2005) found that only
after age 5 did children attribute extraordinary abil-
ities of God rather than the fallible mental abilities
representative of humans, and this was true for
religiously schooled as well as secularly schooled
children. But Barrett et al. (2001) arguably found
support for the preparedness hypothesis in a sam-
ple of Christian children from the United States
and in a sample of Yukatek Maya children (Knight
et al., 2004).
To understand how these seemingly conflicting
results may contribute to a unified theory of chil-
dren’s understanding of extraordinary minds, in
the current study we addressed the interplay
between sociocultural, religious input, and chil-
dren’s developing concepts of extraordinary minds
in three ways: (a) we used the methods employed
by Lane et al. (2010) with a sample of children who
attended religious schools and who were knowl-
edgeable about God, (b) we directly compared the
religiously schooled children with the secularly
schooled children from Lane et al. (2010), and (c)
across both samples, we examined relations
between children’s knowledge of God and their
understanding of extraordinary minds. To capture
the potentially nuanced developmental trajectory of
children’s appreciation for extraordinary minds, we
followed Lane et al. (2010) by densely sampling
children in an age range when they were beginning
to attribute particular mental fallibilities (ignorance
and false beliefs) to ordinary humans, and asked
children about the mental capacities of agents with
contrasting abilities. These agents included ordin-
ary humans, agents with exceptional perceptual
capacities (a cat with night vision, and a superhero
with X-ray vision), and agents with extraordinary
mental capacities (Mr. Smart—an agent who
‘‘knows everything’’—and God). We also systemat-
ically asked children to provide justifications for
their decisions.
In advance, we can consider three possibilities.
First, we might find results for religiously schooled
children very similar to those found by Lane et al.
(2010), who studied children from secular schools.
In particular, when these religiously exposed chil-
dren begin to appreciate a particular limitation of
human minds (e.g., ignorance or false beliefs) they
could, like secularly schooled children, initially
attribute that same limitation to agents with
extraordinary mental capacities (focally, agents pur-
ported to be all knowing). This would suggest that
exposure to information about extraordinary minds
does not affect young children’s initial understand-
ing of extraordinary mental capacities.
On the other hand, sociocultural input about
extraordinary minds might facilitate an early ability
to understand extraordinary mental capacities.
Facilitation of children’s understanding of extra-
ordinary minds due to early religious exposure
could manifest in either of two ways in the current
study. One straightforward possibility is that young
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children who are knowledgeable about God will
resist attributing ignorance or false beliefs to God at
any point, even as they begin to attribute such men-
tal fallibilities to ordinary humans. However, the
effects of religious exposure and knowledge might
be less straightforward and more subtle. For exam-
ple, religiously exposed children may hear and
accept information about God’s extraordinary
capacities, but those capacities may not loom large
in their everyday thinking about God. Thus, a third
possibility is that the influence of religious expo-
sure may surface only when such children are
explicitly informed and reminded about some
agent’s extraordinary abilities. Indeed, while even
adult believers tend to think of God as subject to
many human-like psychological constraints, they
are less likely to do so if first asked questions (and
so reminded) about the nature of God’s powers
(Barrett & Keil, 1996).
Children’s open-ended justifications for the ToM
tasks could also shed light on the nature and timing
of any facilitation due to religious exposure. For
example, possible facilitation effects could poten-
tially occur very early, even before children begin
to appreciate limits of ordinary minds. In this case,
very young religiously exposed children should
mention agents’ special mental abilities (rather than
merely reference reality) in their justifications.
Alternatively, children may only begin to mention
extraordinary capacities after they appreciate cer-
tain ordinary limits of human minds (e.g., false
beliefs or ignorance).
Method
Participants
Sixty-four children participated, all of whom
attended religious Protestant Christian preschools;
they were primarily of European American descent
and middle-class socioeconomic status. We densely
sampled in an age range (54–59 months) in which,
pilot testing showed, children were particularly
likely to begin attributing ignorance or false beliefs
to ordinary humans. The data from 3 children who
were notably distracted were excluded, leaving 61
children (27 males) in the final sample, ranging in
age from 37.87 to 76.53 months (M age = 56.92
months).
Children were recruited from Christian schools
(all of which mentioned God and ⁄or Christ in their
mission statements); these institutions provide a
pool of participants who are typically exposed to
religion, at least at school. School affiliation is the
most commonly used method employed in prior
research to recruit religiously exposed children
(e.g., Bering, Herna´ndez Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005;
Gime´nez-Dası´ et al., 2005; Richert & Barrett, 2005).
However, because parents undoubtedly vary in
their reasons for having their children attend reli-
gious schools, we sought additional information as
to children’s religious exposure and knowledge. In
particular, we asked children about God at several
points in our procedures. From these data (see
Results) we found that 87% were familiar with
God, and that 79% were able to provide specific
details about God (e.g., ‘‘God made us’’; ‘‘God
knows everything’’). Thus, our sample was not
only religiously exposed; children remembered key
details about God. To gather additional information
on children’s religious exposure, we distributed a
follow-up questionnaire to all of the children’s par-
ents. Thirty-eight parents (parents of 62% of the
children) returned the questionnaire. Parallel to the
proportion of children who were familiar with
the concept of God, 84% of these parents reported
that their children attend a place of worship, most
on a weekly basis.
Procedure
Children were interviewed individually at school,
using two tasks identical to those employed by Lane
et al. (2010): a contents false-belief task (Perner
et al., 1987) and a knowledge-ignorance task similar
to that used by Barrett et al. (2001). Half of the chil-
dren received the knowledge-ignorance task first;
the others received the false-belief task first. Chil-
dren were introduced to each agent (displayed on a
card) upon their first exposure to that agent (for
images of the agents and details on how each agent
was introduced, see the Appendix). For each task,
children were presented the girl first; the remaining
agents were presented in random order (except
mom was never presented following the girl).
Measures
False-belief understanding. Children were shown a
crayon box and paper bag. The interviewer asked
children what they thought was inside the crayon
box and then opened both containers to reveal that
the box held marbles and the paper bag held
crayons. Both containers were then closed and the
interviewer checked if children remembered the
contents of both containers; corrective feedback was
offered when necessary but was rarely required.
Then, for each of five agents, children were asked:
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‘‘__ has never been in the room with these things
before. If we show __ this box, all closed up, [pic-
tured agent approaches crayon box] what will __
think is inside here?’’ Children were asked this
question with regard to a girl, their mother, Mr.
Smart (a man who, children were instructed,
‘‘knows everything’’), Heroman (a superhero with
X-ray vision), and God (no information was given
about God). Importantly, the example that we pro-
vided to children in Mr. Smart’s introduction (his
knowing the contents of a box without looking
inside) is directly applicable to our social-cognitive
tasks, for which children decide whether agents
know the contents of containers. To assess the
effects of anthropomorphic cues on children’s con-
cepts of God, half of the sample was not shown a
picture representing God and were not told that
God had ‘‘never been in the room’’; they were just
asked ‘‘What will God think is inside here?’’ To
assess children’s understanding of Mr. Smart’s all-
knowing abilities (without reliance on visual abili-
ties), children were asked what Mr. Smart would
think is in the box if he was far from the box facing
in the opposite direction. For each agent, children
earned a score of 0 if they ascribed a correct belief
or 1 if they ascribed a false belief. Following each
judgment, the interviewer prompted children to jus-
tify their answer by asking, ‘‘Why will __ think __
are inside?’’
Knowledge-ignorance understanding. Children were
shown two boxes that each had a slit, allowing
visual access. Above the first box, a lamp was
turned on, illuminating the inside of the box and
revealing a red plastic frog inside. Above the sec-
ond box, a lamp was turned off, and that box
appeared empty. Children looked into each box
and reported what they saw. After children
affirmed that the lit box contained a frog and that
they could see nothing in the unlit box, the experi-
menter turned on the lamp above the previously
unlit box, revealing another red frog inside. That
light was then turned off, and the experimenter
reminded children, ‘‘So, both boxes have a frog
inside but you can’t see the frog when this one is
dark [pointing at the unlit box].’’ The interviewer
then checked if children remembered the contents
of both boxes; corrective feedback was offered
when needed but was rarely required. Children
were then asked the following for each of six agents
with regard to the unlit box: ‘‘__ has never been in
this room with these boxes before. If __ comes very
close to the top of the dark box, what will __ think
is inside here; a frog or nothing?’’ For this focal
question, the experimenter held the agent’s picture
above the unlit box, facing the contents of the box.
Children were asked this question for each of six
different agents: a girl, their mom, Mr. Smart (a
man who ‘‘knows everything’’), Heroman (a super-
hero with X-ray vision), and God (about whom
children were told nothing). Because this knowl-
edge-ignorance task involves specifically children’s
understand that darkness limits visual access to
information, we added another agent with percep-
tual abilities that were directly applicable to this
task—a cat that can see in the dark (see also Barrett
et al., 2001; Lane et al., 2010). Again, half of the
sample received no picture of God and were not
told that God had ‘‘never been in this room’’; they
were only asked ‘‘What will God think is inside
here; a frog or nothing?’’ To emphasize Mr. Smart’s
reliance on mental and not visual abilities, children
were asked what Mr. Smart would think is in the
box if he was far from the box, facing away from
the box. For each agent, children earned a score of
0 if they attributed correct knowledge or 1 if they
attributed ignorance. Following each judgment, the
interviewer prompted children to justify their
answer by asking, ‘‘Why will __ think __ is inside?’’
Children’s understanding of ignorance can be mea-
sured with a variety of tasks. We chose this task
because it parallels that used by Barrett et al. (2001)
and is identical to the one used by Lane et al.
(2010), thus allowing a direct comparison with their
findings. As is typical with knowledge-ignorance
tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004), Lane et al. (2010)
found that children pass this task earlier than the
false-belief task.
Knowledge of God. To obtain further information
about children’s knowledge of God, following the
ToM tasks, the interviewer told children, ‘‘Tell me
about God.’’ If children could not provide any
details initially, they were prompted, ‘‘Tell me any-
thing you know about God.’’ If children still pro-
vided no information, children were asked, ‘‘Have
you ever heard of God?’’
Coding. The reasoning children used to justify
their knowledge-ignorance and false-belief judg-
ments were coded into 10 focal categories (see
Table 1) and an additional ‘‘uninformative’’ cate-
gory. To assess interrater reliability, 25% of the
justifications were coded by two coders (one blind
to all hypotheses of the study); all js ‡ .88.
Children’s familiarity with information about
God was assessed using their justifications for
God’s knowledge and beliefs for the ToM tasks
combined with children’s responses to the final
open-ended questions about God. Knowledge of God
was coded as an ordinal variable with higher
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values representing greater knowledge of God,
especially God’s extraordinary powers: (0) Child
does not report knowing about God, (1) child has
heard of God but cannot provide details, (2) child
provides some details about God (e.g., location,
physical status, role, relevance in prayer, connec-
tion with Jesus, connection with Heaven; mentions
that God is ‘‘loving,’’ ‘‘not a person,’’ ‘‘a special
person’’), (3) child mentions exceptional abilities
that are not perceptual or mental (e.g., role in crea-
tion, omnipresence, ‘‘God has powers’’), or (4) child
specifically mentions extraordinary perceptual or
mental abilities. Similar measures (aggregating
across multiple responses) have been used effec-
tively in other studies investigating relations
between children’s religious knowledge and con-
ceptual development (e.g., Bamford & Lagattuta,
2010). Intercoder agreement was 96.7% for the cur-
rent knowledge of God measure.
Results
In preliminary analyses, we assessed whether the
presentation of the image representing God and lan-
guage suggesting God’s physical presence affected
Table 1
Coding of Open-Ended Responses
Examples
Category Description Knowledge-ignorance task False-belief task
Reality based Cites actual contents of container
without mentioning agent’s
mental or perceptual capacities
‘‘There is a frog’’
‘‘Someone put it in there’’
‘‘There are marbles inside the
box’’
‘‘The crayons are in the bag’’
Appearance based Cites the appearance of the box ‘‘It’s dark’’
‘‘It’s very dark’’
‘‘It has crayons on it’’
‘‘There’s a sign with crayons’’
Typicality based Cites the type of container or
mentions what that type of
container typically holds
‘‘It’s supposed to be in there’’
‘‘It belongs in there’’
‘‘It’s a crayon box’’
‘‘They belong in there’’
Inadequate
perceptual
capacities
Cites agent’s inadequate, senses
(e.g., inadequate vision)
‘‘It’s too dark to see inside’’
‘‘He can’t see all the way
down’’
‘‘She can’t see what’s inside’’
‘‘Someone can’t see there’’
‘‘He’s not here’’
Exceptional
perceptual
capacities
Cites agent’s exceptional senses
(e.g., vision, hearing)
‘‘He can see in the dark’’
‘‘He can see through
everything’’
‘‘He can see through the box’’
‘‘He can look through stuff’’
Extraordinary
mental capacities
Cites agent’s mental capacities
without referring to perceptual
capacities
‘‘He’s very smart’’
‘‘He’s a good rememberer’’
‘‘He’s super smart’’
‘‘He knows a lot’’
Adequate
perceptual or
mental capacities
Explains that the agent will
perceive or know the contents of
container without referencing
extraordinary abilities
‘‘Because he saw it’’
‘‘He’ll see a frog’’
‘‘She knows a frog’s in there’’
‘‘He’ll see marbles’’
‘‘She looked in there’’
‘‘Because she knows’’
Powerful Cites the agent’s general
powerfulness without referencing
specific perceptual or mental
abilities
‘‘He has every kind of powers’’
‘‘He has lots of power’’
‘‘He’s powerful and he’s great’’
‘‘He has powers’’
Creator Reports that the agent designed or
created the focal stimuli
‘‘He made animals’’ ‘‘He made marbles’’
‘‘He made them and put them
in the crayon box; and he
made the box’’
Want ⁄Desire based Explains how agent’s knowledge
or beliefs were driven by desires
or preferences
‘‘He wanted to play with it’’
‘‘He wants to give it to another
person for a pet’’
‘‘She likes marbles’’
‘‘Boys love to play with toys’’
‘‘She wants to play with them’’
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children’s attribution of anthropomorphic, fallible
mental abilities to God. For the false-belief task,
27% of children who were presented the image and
language, and 16% of those children who neither
saw the image nor heard the language, attributed
to God a false belief, v2(1, N = 61) = 1.01, ns. For
the knowledge-ignorance task, 47% of children who
were presented the image and language, and 19%
who neither saw the image nor heard the language,
attributed ignorance to God, v2(1, N = 61) = 5.16,
p = .023. Because this one effect of image did not
vary between age groups—i.e., in a 3 (age group) ·
2 (image + language vs. no image + language) anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) there was no interaction
between age and image, F(2, 55) = .35, ns,
gp
2 = .01—and because of modest sample sizes, we
combined both groups of children in our main
analyses.
In the following analyses, ‘‘correct knowledge’’
and ‘‘correct beliefs’’ refer to judgments that an
agent knows what is actually in the boxes (for the
false-belief task, marbles; for the knowledge-
ignorance task, a frog). ‘‘Ignorance’’ and ‘‘false
beliefs’’ refer to judgments that an agent is mis-
taken about the contents of the boxes (for the
knowledge-ignorance task, that the agent thinks
nothing is inside; for the false-belief task, that the
agent thinks crayons are inside). Initial analyses
assessed whether some children concurrently
attributed human-like, fallible mental states to
normal humans and to extraordinary beings, as
expected under an anthropomorphism hypothesis.
Indeed, many children attributed ignorance or
false beliefs to each of the special agents—God,
Mr. Smart, and Heroman—and those who did so
also attributed false beliefs and ignorance to the girl
and mom at levels above chance—God, v2s(1)
> 9.30, ps < .01; Mr. Smart, v2s(1) > 9.30, ps < .01;
Heroman, v2s(1) > 3.50, ps < .06. Thus, many
children consistently attributed limited mental
capacities to all agents.
Of focal interest was whether a pattern of attrib-
uting human-like capacities to ‘‘special’’ agents
would be common when children began to under-
stand that humans may hold fallible mental states.
Thus, initially, we examined children’s judgments
to find developmental periods during which chil-
dren first began attributing ignorance and false
beliefs, respectively, to ordinary humans (their
mom and the girl)—constitution of the ‘‘middle’’
age groups for both tasks were based on these data,
their judgments of ordinary humans. For the oldest
age groups, we identified immediately subsequent
periods during which children consistently attrib-
uted accurate knowledge or beliefs, respectively, to
God. Because children often reach an understand-
ing of ignorance and false-beliefs at different points
in ToM development (Wellman & Liu, 2004), it was
important to create separate age groupings for the
knowledge-ignorance task and false belief task.
Based upon this preliminary analysis, we divided
children into three age groups for the knowledge-
ignorance task: 15 in the young group (37.9–
51.0 months; M = 45.6), 20 in the middle group
(51.2–59.6 months; M = 55.9), and 26 in the oldest
group (59.7–76.5 months; M = 64.2); and for the
false-belief task: 23 in the young group (37.9–
55.4 months; M = 48.3), 12 in the middle group
(55.6–59.7 months; M = 57.7), and 26 in the oldest
group (59.7–76.5 months; M = 64.2). Thus, the mid-
dle age group for the knowledge-ignorance task is
younger than the middle age group for the false-
belief task (consistent with the meta-analysis of
Wellman & Liu, 2004, as well as the findings of
Lane et al., 2010).
Judgments
Figures 1 and 2 depict the percentage of children
who attributed ignorance and false beliefs to each
agent, by age group. An initial repeated measures
ANOVA for children’s attributions of ignorance
with age as a between-subjects factor (3: young,
middle, old), and agent as a within-subjects factor
(6: mom, girl, Mr. Smart, Heroman, cat, God),
revealed significant main effects for age, F(2, 58)
= 9.66, p < .001, gp
2 = .25, and agent, F(5, 54) =
10.43, p < .001, gp
2 = .49, and a significant interaction
between age and agent, F(10, 108) = 2.16, p < .05,
gp
2 = .17. A separate ANOVA assessing children’s
attributions of false beliefs to the five agents (the cat
was not included in the false-belief tasks) revealed
similar effects of age, F(2, 58) = 10.48, p < .001,
gp
2 = .27, and agent, F(4, 55) = 11.63, p < .001,
gp
2 = .46, and a significant interaction between age
and agent, F(8, 110) = 3.23, p < .01, gp
2 = .19.
These interactions were explored in individual,
repeated measures ANOVAs for each age group,
revealing that for the youngest children there were
no differences between agents in children’s attri-
butions of ignorance, F(5, 10) = 1.63, ns, gp
2 = .20,
or false beliefs, F(4, 19) = 1.26, ns, gp
2 = .16; young
children attributed correct mental states to all
agents at levels significantly greater than chance
(ts > 2.80, ps < .05). Compared to the youngest
children, those in the middle age groups attributed
ignorance more often to the girl, mom, God, and
Mr. Smart, ts(33) > 2.03, ps < .05, Cohen’s ds > 0.70,
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and attributed false beliefs more often to the girl,
mom, and God, ts(33) > 3.03, ps < .01, Cohen’s
ds > 0.95. There were, however, no differences
between the youngest and middle groups in
attributions of correct mental states (i.e., the
containers’ actual contents) to the agents with
exceptional perception—Heroman and the cat.
Within the middle age groups, children selec-
tively attributed ignorance, F(5, 15) = 3.13, p < .05,
gp
2 = .51, and false beliefs, F(4, 8) = 3.29, p = .07,
gp
2 = .62, to the different agents, as did children
in the oldest age groups for the knowledge-igno-
rance task, F(5, 21) = 13.05, p < .001, gp
2 = .76, and
the false-belief task, F(4, 22) = 8.67, p < .001,
gp
2 = .61. Specifically, children in the middle
groups differentiated between the correct mental
states of Heroman and the cat, and the fallible
mental states of ordinary humans (mom and the
girl), for knowledge, ts(19) > 2.90, ps < .01,
Cohen’s ds > 1.30; for beliefs ts(11) > 2.34, ps < .05,
Cohen’s ds > 1.40. But children in the middle
groups generally did not differentiate between the
mental states of the ordinary humans (mom and
the girl) and the mental states of God (to whom
more than half of the children attributed igno-
rance or false beliefs). Across multiple compari-
sons between God and the ordinary humans, just
one—mom versus God for the false-belief task—
was significant, t(11) = 2.35, p < .05, Cohen’s
d = 1.41. Only the oldest children (59 months and
older) consistently differentiated between the cor-
rect knowledge and beliefs of God and the fallible
knowledge and beliefs of mom and the girl,
ts(25) > 4.04, ps < .001, Cohen’s ds > 1.60. In these
respects, our data mimic those of Lane et al.
(2010). In contrast to those data on children from
nonreligious schools, however, these religiously
schooled children in both middle and older
groups attributed correct knowledge and beliefs to
Mr. Smart, unlike mom and the girl, ts > 2.66,
ps < .05, Cohen’s ds > 1.50.
Parametric statistics were used in these focal
analyses because ANOVAs are robust against viola-
tions of assumptions of normality for such
data, and indeed may be preferable in repeated
measures designs using dichotomous data (Seeger
& Gabrielsson, 1968). Nonparametric results further
confirm our core findings. In these analyses,
the overall effects for agent remained significant
for knowledge-ignorance judgments (Cochran’s Q =
78.61, p < .001), and for false-belief judgments
(Cochran’s Q = 60.15, p < .001). Significant differ-
ences in judgments of ignorance and false beliefs
between the youngest and middle age groups were
replicated using Mann–Whitney U tests (Us £
107.50, Zs ‡ 1.95, ps £ .05). And within age group
differences in children’s attributions of ignorance or
false beliefs to pairs of agents (e.g., mom vs.
Mr. Smart) were replicated using Wilcoxon signed
ranks tests (Zs ‡ 2.00, ps < .05).
Figure 1. Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the agent will be ignorant about the contents of the unlit box (i.e., will
think that the unlit box has nothing inside).
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Justifications
Children’s justifications clarify the reasoning
used in making their judgments. We focus on three
contrasting ‘‘special’’ agents: Heroman (whose spe-
cial vision was described), Mr. Smart (who was
described as having an extraordinary mind, but no
specific exceptional perceptual mechanism), and
God (about whom we told children nothing). Justi-
fications for correct knowledge and beliefs are par-
ticularly revealing because they address which (if
any) extraordinary capacities children attributed to
these agents. Table 2 presents data on the primary
ways in which children justified these three agents’
correct knowledge and beliefs. The column with
the mean ages depicts an age-graded trend in chil-
dren’s justifications: at younger ages, children cited
reality (e.g., ‘‘There are marbles inside the box,’’
‘‘There is a frog’’) or provided uninformative
answers (e.g., ‘‘Because,’’ ‘‘I don’t know’’), at a
somewhat older age children cited agents’ adequate
perceptual or mental capacities (e.g., ‘‘He saw it,’’
‘‘She knows’’), and at the oldest ages children made
specific reference to agents’ exceptional perceptual
or extraordinary mental abilities (e.g., ‘‘He can see
through the box,’’ ‘‘He’s super smart’’).
Children could offer different types of justifica-
tions for each of the three ‘‘special’’ agents, and so
to assess whether these age trends were statistically
significant, we split children into two independent
groups for both of the tasks: (a) those children who
referred to reality or provided uninformative
answers (and who never cited exceptional ⁄ extra-
ordinary mental or perceptual capacities) and (b)
Table 2
Justifications Used to Explain Agents’ Correct Knowledge and Beliefs
Category
Correct knowledge Correct beliefs
M age SE n M age SE n
Uninformative 51.43 2.53 14 52.12 2.14 17
Reality 52.70 2.51 8 52.53 2.04 14
Adequate perception or adequate mental 56.83 3.05 10 58.02 3.60 8
Exceptional perception 60.80 1.03 27 60.87 1.28 26
Extraordinary mental 60.54 1.24 24 60.79 1.21 25
Note. n = number of children who used justification category at least once to account for the correct knowledge or beliefs of Heroman,
Mr. Smart, or God.
Figure 2. Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the agent will hold a false belief (i.e., will think that there are crayons in
the box).
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those children who cited exceptional ⁄extraordinary
mental or perceptual capacities (and who never
cited reality or provided uninformative answers).
For the false-belief task, 85% of the children fell into
one of the two groups, and children who provided
uninformative or reality-based justifications were
significantly younger (M age = 50.02, SD = 7.39)
than children who cited extraordinary mental or
perceptual abilities (M age = 60.62, SD = 6.49),
t(50) = 5.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.52. For the
knowledge-ignorance task, 80% of the children
fit into one of the two groups, and children who
cited reality or provided uninformative answers
were again significantly younger (M age = 51.51,
SD = 8.97) than children who explicitly cited extra-
ordinary mental or perceptual capacities (M age =
60.45, SD = 5.63), t(47) = 4.30, p < .001, Cohen’s
d = 1.19. Thus, although the youngest and oldest
groups of children both attributed ‘‘correct’’ mental
states to the special agents, they evidenced very
different reasoning, with the youngest children
displaying a reality bias and the oldest children
demonstrating an appreciation for the agents’
particular mental and perceptual powers.
Religiously Schooled Versus Secularly Schooled Children
The tasks and procedures used here are identical
to those used by Lane et al. (2010) for 56 children
attending secular preschools (ages 40–73 months;
M age = 54 months). Across both samples, 77 par-
ents (66%) completed a questionnaire on their chil-
dren’s religious exposure—38 parents (62%) for the
current religiously schooled sample, and 39 parents
(70%) for Lane et al.’s secularly schooled sample.
Using a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (daily), those par-
ents in the current religiously schooled sample
reported that their children were exposed to signifi-
cantly more media (stories, movies, music, games)
about God (M = 3.29, SD = 0.93) than did parents
of secularly schooled children from Lane et al.
(M = 1.99, SD = 0.96), t(75) = 6.07, p < .001, Cohen’s
d = 1.37. Moreover, parents of the religiously
schooled children reported that their children more
frequently attended a place of worship (M = 3.45,
SD = 1.03) than the secularly schooled children
from Lane et al. (M = 2.26, SD = 1.35), t(75) = 4.34,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.99.
These parental data help confirm that school
attended (religious vs. secular) was a reliable proxy
for children’s overall exposure to concepts of God.
Moreover, the identical procedures used in the two
studies allow some informative comparisons based
on religious exposure. Comparisons across all con-
ditions for the two groups of children (religious vs.
secularly schooled) would be problematic because
the children came from different communities and
the age ranges indentified for the critical ‘‘middle
age’’ children are different for the religiously and
secularly schooled groups. Nonetheless, several
focal comparisons are possible. In particular, while
trends and results are largely parallel in both stud-
ies for most agents, there are some key differences,
especially for Mr. Smart. First, using the same age
range for the middle group as that used by Lane
et al. (2010; for knowledge-ignorance: 49.5–
54.5 months; for false belief: 52.5–58.9 months), reli-
giously schooled children in this middle age group
attributed correct mental states (knowledge and
beliefs of the containers’ actual contents) to Mr.
Smart (but not God) significantly above chance:
v2(1, n = 9) = 5.44, p < .05 for knowledge; v2(1,
n = 14) = 7.14, p < .01 for beliefs; whereas similarly
aged secularly schooled children attributed fallible
mental states to Mr. Smart, just as they did for
mom, the girl, and God. Further, religiously
schooled children in this age range were much
more likely to attribute correct knowledge and
beliefs to Mr. Smart (Mann–Whitney Us < 60.00,
Zs > 2.78, ps < .01) than were their secularly
schooled peers. They were also somewhat more
likely to attribute correct knowledge and beliefs
to God (Mann–Whitney Us < 77.00, Zs > 1.97,
ps < .05).
Beyond using school as a proxy for religious
exposure, we also more directly gauged children’s
religious exposure by their scores on our knowl-
edge of God measure. These data, yielding a score
of 0–4 summarizing children’s knowledge of God,
were available for every child in both studies
(n = 117). On this knowledge of God measure,
religiously schooled children in the current study
scored significantly higher (M = 2.56, SD = 1.38)
than secularly schooled children in Lane et al.
(2010; M = 1.88, SD = 1.67), t(115) = 2.41, p < .05,
Cohen’s d = 0.44. Of the religiously schooled chil-
dren, 79% received scores > 1 (provided details
about God), and 56% received scores of 3 or 4
(mentioned God’s exceptional abilities). In contrast,
only 59% of the secularly schooled children from
Lane et al. received a score of 1 or greater and only
37% received scores of 3 or 4.
Children’s knowledge of God not only further
validates the group differences in religious
exposure, it provides an additional way to consider
how exposure to religious instruction influenced
children’s responses on our tasks. Collapsing across
data from both the religious and secular samples,
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we assessed the relation between children’s knowl-
edge of God and their attributions of ignorance and
false beliefs to three of the ‘‘special’’ agents: God,
Mr. Smart, and Heroman. For both tasks, Pearson
correlations indicated that children’s knowledge of
God predicted their attributions of correct mental
states to the three agents, but only among children
who understood the constraints of human minds
(i.e., who attributed ignorance or false beliefs,
respectively, to both the girl and mom). Thus, for
children who attributed false beliefs to Mom and
the girl, knowledge of God predicted attributions of
correct beliefs to God, r(55) = .50, p < .001; to
Mr. Smart, r(55) = .35, p < .01; and to Heroman,
r(55) = .45, p < .001. Similarly, among children who
attributed ignorance to Mom and the girl, knowl-
edge of God predicted attributions of correct
knowledge to God, r(65) = .45, p < .001, and Hero-
man, r(65) = .24, p = .05; for Mr. Smart the trend
was in the expected direction, albeit nonsignificant,
r(65) = .20.
We next assessed relations between children’s
knowledge of God and the justifications they
offered when considering the mental states of the
other two special agents, Heroman and Mr. Smart.
For each of the five most often used catego-
ries—extraordinary mental abilities, exceptional
perception, adequate abilities, reality-based reason-
ing, and uninformative reasoning—children were
given a point if they used that justification for
either Heroman or Mr. Smart on the false-belief
task, and a point if they used that justification for
either agent on the knowledge-ignorance task
(scores for each of the five justification categories
could range from 0 to 2). Controlling for age, chil-
dren’s knowledge of God predicted less use of
uninformative justifications, r(114) = ).19, p < .05;
marginally fewer references to adequate abilities,
r(114) = ).16, p = .09; and focally, greater reference
to exceptional perception, r(114) = .24, p < .01, as
well as extraordinary mental abilities, r(114) = .25,
p < .01. In sum, more sophisticated knowledge of
God’s abilities predicted greater reference to excep-
tional or extraordinary capacities for other special
agents, and this was not merely a function of other
age-related developments.
Discussion
Human social cognition is characterized by an abil-
ity to consider the ordinary minds of fellow
humans as well as the extraordinary minds of
nonhuman and superhuman beings (Boyer, 1996).
Several recent studies suggest that the route
through which children come to appreciate such
extraordinary minds is best described as anthropo-
morphic. Initially, very young children treat all
minds similarly in that they fail to understand the
distinction between (potentially fallible) mental
states and reality. Thus, on standard ToM tasks, if
required to judge others’ knowledge or beliefs they
merely report states of reality for ordinary humans
and for extraordinary agents. Second, and critically,
when children begin to appreciate certain limita-
tions of human epistemic states (e.g., false beliefs)
they attribute those same cognitive constraints to
most other agents, including supernatural agents
(Gime´nez-Dası´ et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2010; Makris
& Pnevmatikos, 2007). The current study revealed
this overall pattern of results from children who
were raised in specifically religious contexts and
who were knowledgeable about God, using meth-
ods that help to resolve discrepancies in prior
results. The detailed findings go beyond confirming
an early childhood anthropomorphism, however, to
shed light on ways in which sociocultural input
about agents with supernatural mental capacities
(i.e., exposure to knowledge about God) influences
an early appreciation for extraordinary mental
abilities.
A strict anthropomorphism account would claim
that young children think of God (and all other spe-
cial agents) in terms of human capacities and do so
throughout the preschool years and well beyond
(Piaget, 1929 ⁄1969). Much recent data, including
our own, contradict any such strict account by
demonstrating that 4- and 5-year-olds often allow
some agents certain nonhuman capacities, as is first
apparent for exceptional perceptual capacities (our
Heroman and cat, but see also Richert & Barrett,
2005). As we have noted, however, one key issue
concerns children at transitional points when they
are beginning to acknowledge particular limits of
human mental capacities. Although they espouse
preparedness rather than anthropomorphism,
Richert and Barrett (2005) also adopt this view
when they say that, if the anthropomorphism
account is correct, then ‘‘when children understand
that humans have limited perspectives, they will
also attribute limited perspectives to God and other
nonhumans . . . a 3-year-old’s apparently accurate
representation of God will begin to disintegrate as
he or she acquires a ‘theory of mind’’’ (p. 292). The
current study, along with others (Gime´nez-Dası´
et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2010; Makris & Pnevmati-
kos, 2007), lends support to just such an anthropo-
morphism hypothesis.
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Our evidence from children’s justifications
reveals that, much like secularly schooled children
(Lane et al., 2010), young religiously schooled
children’s failure on false-belief and knowledge-
ignorance tasks reflects an early reality bias, not an
appreciation for extraordinary mental abilities. That
is, very young children simply reference conditions
in the world, reality, to infer others’ mental states,
without considering others’ mental limits (like false
beliefs) or mental capacities (like omniscience). Fur-
ther, the current data demonstrate that much like
children from secular schools, religiously schooled
children who are beginning to appreciate certain
limitations of human minds (ignorance and false
beliefs) typically also attribute those constraints to
agents whom they are raised to believe ‘‘know
everything’’—in this case, the Judeo-Christian God.
We focus on God here, for the moment, because
Barrett and colleagues in articulating their pre-
paredness account claim that children should
always ‘‘resist treating God like a human.’’ Further,
they claim that it is ‘‘quite easy for young children
to represent God as different from humans’’
(Richert & Barrett, 2005, pp. 292–293). On the con-
trary, with regard to God in particular, data from
the current study provide compelling evidence that
when children begin to understand the cognitive
limitations of humans, they typically attribute those
same limitations to God, and this applies even to
religiously exposed children. Only later, at around
age 5 years did religiously exposed children reli-
ably differentiate between humans’ fallible mental
abilities and inaccurate mental states versus God’s
less fallible abilities and states. These results
suggest that in their everyday reasoning, even chil-
dren who are raised in religious settings often
initially understand God’s mind as constrained and
fallible, very similar to their understanding of
ordinary human minds. Indeed, in their everyday
reasoning, even adults who profess beliefs in God’s
extraordinary capacities tend to think of God as
being subject to ordinary, human-like perceptual
and mental constraints (Barrett & Keil, 1996).
However, our results also speak to the important
influence of sociocultural input, as indexed by reli-
gious exposure, in children’s conceptual develop-
ment and suggest that, with guidance, even quite
young children can consider some agents’ minds as
less fallible. Four-year-olds in this religiously
exposed sample, just as secularly schooled children
in the earlier study (Lane et al., 2010), attributed
accurate knowledge and beliefs to agents with excep-
tional perceptual abilities (e.g., Heroman), and,
moreover, specifically referred to special perceptual
abilities when justifying why these agents hold privi-
leged information. As described earlier, this may be,
in part, a product of children’s exposure to media
about certain agents’ exceptional perception (e.g.,
Superman’s X-ray vision) from a very early age.
More novel and intriguing, religiously exposed
children in this study as young as 4 years evi-
denced an early appreciation for extraordinary
mental abilities in their responses to Mr. Smart, an
agent whose mental prowess they were first primed
and then reminded about (Mr. Smart ‘‘knows
everything’’). This contrasts with the secularly
schooled children studied by Lane et al. (2010) who
received the same instructions and reminders about
Mr. Smart. Thus, consistent exposure to ideas about
the extraordinary mental and perceptual abilities of
one agent—the Judeo-Christian God—may have
facilitated children’s understanding of Mr. Smart
when children were specifically instructed and
reminded he ‘‘knows everything.’’ This occurred
even though religious exposure had not yet
resulted in children’s spontaneous attribution of
extraordinary mental capacities to God. Thus, at
4 years, an understanding that extraordinary agents
can have extraordinary knowledge (know the con-
tents of containers without perceiving those con-
tents) had not yet reached a level of intuitive
fluency. These data suggest that children’s anthro-
pomorphism strongly influenced their ability to
apply the culturally ⁄ religiously provided informa-
tion about ‘‘God’’ but that their ongoing religious
instruction nonetheless facilitated their ability to
apply information about extraordinary mental
states when that information was directly and
immediately provided. This could account for their
relative sensitivity to information that we explicitly
provided about Mr. Smart’s extraordinary mind.
Notably, the difference between the religiously
schooled children in this study and the secularly
schooled children in a previous study (Lane et al.,
2010) with respect to Mr. Smart (and even some-
what to God) was found for children in the mid-
dle age groups; that is, those children who were
beginning to appreciate certain capacities and limi-
tations of ordinary human minds. Indeed, among
children who understood the fallible mental capac-
ities of the girl and mom, children’s knowledge of
God predicted attributions of correct mental states
to Heroman, Mr. Smart, and God. Thus, this
period—when children are beginning to appreciate
certain limits of human minds (e.g., the connection
between seeing and knowing)—may also represent
a period when children are particularly receptive
to cultural input about extraordinary capacities
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that exceed those particular limits, and can begin
to incorporate this information into their existing
ToM.
In sum, the current study reveals that develop-
ing concepts of extraordinary perceptual and
psychological abilities are a function of both chil-
dren’s conceptual architecture and the sociocul-
tural input that children receive, and that
conceptual change is not a simple product of the
two. Importantly, the impact of sociocultural input
on conceptual development varies depending
upon children’s existing conceptual structure (see
also Evans, 2001). One way to describe the current
results, therefore, is that sociocultural input is
assimilated only to the extent that children’s cur-
rent conceptual structure—in this case, children’s
ToM—is able to integrate that input. Taken
together with the data from Lane et al. (2010), we
provide evidence that, although children may not
be prepared to understand extraordinary mental
capacities, at a certain point in ToM development
(at around 4 years in this population), sociocul-
tural input can facilitate an early appreciation for
extraordinary minds. This would represent a
developmental version of Sperber’s (1996) reason-
ing about the ‘‘epidemiology of beliefs,’’ with a
focus on how ‘‘previously internalized cultural
representations are a key factor in one’s suscepti-
bility to new representations’’ (p. 84). Children’s
developing understanding of ordinary minds
makes them susceptible, at key junctures, to socio-
culturally provided information about extraordi-
nary minds.
A next step in understanding children’s concepts
of extraordinary minds is to chart more specifically
the intricate interplay between conceptual develop-
ment and sociocultural input over the preschool
and early elementary school years. Two lines of
research seem particularly important for this endea-
vor. First, although we provide evidence that, with
cultural assistance, children as young as 4 years
can begin to appreciate the extraordinary capacities
of some agents (e.g., knowing the contents of con-
tainers without looking inside); children at this age
are not evidencing a full-fledged understanding of
anything like omniscience. Omniscience refers to an
agent’s ability to know everything—not just the con-
tents of boxes but also facts about the past and
present, an ability to foretell the future, an ability to
read minds, and much more. Arguably children’s
appreciation that some special agents can know
contents of containers without seeing those contents
marks the very beginning of a developing grasp of
extraordinary mental abilities—the first of many
steps involved in achieving an understanding of
omniscience. Much as a developing understanding
of ordinary minds proceeds through a series of
developmental steps (Wellman & Liu, 2004), so
might a developing understanding of extraordinary
minds. Future research should address when and
how children come to appreciate that certain
extraordinary agents (such as the Judeo-Christian
God) can possess these other types of knowledge
and how the progressive understanding of extra-
ordinary mental capacities undergirds a remarkably
counterintuitive understanding of total omni-
science.
Second, as detailed in the current study and by
Lane et al. (2010), some of these developmental
transitions may last for only brief periods and are
thus difficult to capture using cross-sectional data.
Thus, a worthwhile next venture is to examine how
these developments unfold longitudinally, using a
microgenetic approach. Such work will shed fur-
ther light on the precise development of supernatu-
ral concepts as children confront the limits of the
human mind.
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Appendix: Agent Images and Introductions
Girl
Let’s talk about Mary. [Show picture of Mary]
Mom
Let’s talk about your mom [show picture of mom]. It’s not really a picture of your      
mom, but let’s say it is.
Cat
This is a kitty cat [show picture of cat]. This kitty cat has special eyes that let him see 
in the dark.
Heroman
[Show picture of Heroman and say:] 
This is Heroman. Heroman has super powers. He can fly very fast so that he can 
help lots of people all over the world.  He also has eyes that let him see the 
insides of things, he can even see through walls. 
[Show child a pen] Can you see this pen? [Place pen out-of-sight, behind paper] 
Now can you see the pen? [Place picture of Heroman on child’s side of the paper] 
Well, Heroman can still see the pen. He can see through the paper and see the pen 
on the other side.
Remember, Heroman can fly very fast and can see right through things
Mr. Smart
[Show picture of Mr. Smart, facing the child (away from the box) and say: ] This is Mr. Smart. 
Mr. Smart has special powers. He knows everything.
[Show child closed opaque container that has a ball inside]. 
Do you know what’s inside here? [Child responds: “No”]. 
Well, this is the first time that I’ve played with this, so I don’t know what’s 
inside either. Mr. Smart also hasn’t played with this before. But because he’s 
so smart he still knows what’s inside. We would have to look inside, but he wouldn’t even need to look. 
Mr. Smart, what do you think is in here? [Lean next to Mr. Smart]
Mr. Smart thinks that there is a ball inside. Let’s see. [Open container and show child the ball] 
Mr. Smart was right! Wow, he knows everything!
Remember, Mr. Smart is very smart. He knows everything. [Place Mr. Smart face-down, away from box]
God
Let’s talk about God [show picture]. It’s not really a picture of God, but let’s 
say it is.
Note. Picture representing God (and language alluding to God’s physical 
presence) was only presented to half of the sample.
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